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acquittal. 
The state charged 
appropriating 
d cou 
Johnson 
(R., pp. 30-31.) 
following evidence was presented: 
a 
theft by unauthorized 
matter proceeded to trial, 
Steve Beaudry modifies Kawasaki motorcycles police use. (Tr., p. 9, L. 
24 - 16, L. 5.) a competitor, canceled 
Beaudry's contract to be a Kawasaki dealer, necessitating that Beaudry acquire 
the motorcycles he wished modify through a Kawasaki dealer. (Tr., p. 16, L. 6 
- p. 18, L. 12.) Beaudry thereafter arranged to purchase motorcycles through 
Darrick Johnson, doing business as Edge Performance, an authorized Kawasaki 
dealer. (Tr., p. 18, L. 13 - p. 19, L. 25.) Beaudry gave Johnson a check for the 
purchase of four motorcycles from Kawasaki. (Tr., p. 20, L. 1 - p. 21, L. 2.) 
Johnson was to keep five percent of the money and the rest he was to use to 
order the motorcycles from Kawasaki. (Tr., p. 21, L. 3 - p. 22, L. 7; p. 22, Ls. 13-
21.) 
Johnson deposited the money. (Tr., p. 29, Ls. 12-14.) He told Beaudry 
the bikes had been ordered from Kawasaki. (Tr., p. 30, L. 13 - p. 31, L. 7.) 
Johnson later claimed delays in getting the bikes were due to Kawasaki's 
reluctance to provide the motorcycles for Beaudry. (Tr., p. 32, L. 20 - p. 33, L, 
1 
After significant delay, Beaudry asked for his money back and Johnson 
that Kawasaki it. , p. 34, Ls. 6-19.) Shortly 
Johnson instructed Beaudry to not contact him again, but that he would contact 
Beaudry "the second I have the check." (Tr., p. 34, L. 20 - p. 35, L. 8.) Beaudry 
approached Johnson in the showroom and asked for either the motorcycles or 
the return of his money, but Johnson said he was keeping the money "and not 
giving it back." (Tr., p. 35, L. 18 - p. 36, 12.) Johnson never ordered the 
motorcycles for Beaudry but instead used the money to purchase motorcycles 
that he sold through his business. (Tr., p. 49, 12 - p. 55, L. 2; State's Exhibits 
1, 2.) 
At the conclusion of the state's case Johnson moved for an acquittal, 
asserting the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. (Tr., p. 65, L. 
24 - p. 76, L. 24.) After a break to review the relevant case law, the district court 
indicated its analysis and stated it was "going to grant the motion to acquit." (Tr., 
p. 76, L. 25 p. 79, L. 3.) The prosecutor responded with further argument about 
why the evidence was sufficient and requested reconsideration. (Tr., p. 79, L. 22 
p. 83, L. 2.) The court agreed to reconsider. (Tr., p. 83, L. 3; p. 87, Ls. 2-13.) 
The next day the court took the motion to acquit back up, noting it had 
given the matter "more review and more thought." (Tr., p. 93, Ls. 4-13.) It stated 
that the "facts that have been adduced thus far in the case" were as follows: 
Beaudry paid $55,256 to the defendant on October 8, 2011, for the 
purchase of four motorcycles. Mr. Johnson promised delivery 
within one week to ten days. The text messages which are in 
evidence show that they began on October 10, 2011. There were 
first discussions about issues with respect to the check being 
cashed. On the next day, October 11, it was confirmed that the 
2 
concerned, was on October 1 
would not ship the bikes because they were going to be going 
ultimately to Mr. Beaudry. On October 25 Mr. Beaudry asked for 
his money back. Mr. Johnson stated in effect he would not-he 
would get it back when they, meaning Kawasaki, sent it to Mr. 
Johnson. And later that day Mr. Johnson tells Mr. Beaudry 
contact him anymore. 
Also earlier on October 6 Spokane County sent out a notice 
of request for bids for a motorcycle, the same make and model as 
Beaudry subsequently contracted to buy from Edge performance, 
Johnson's company. And Edge Performance sent a bid 
City of Spokane-the City of Spokane, not Spokane County, on 
October 20, 2011. The city accepted the bid on November 22, and 
purchase order went out on 
(Tr., p. 93, L. 14 - p. 94, L. 18.) The district court applied law to those facts 
and concluded that the jury could conclude Johnson had taken unauthorized 
control of the money by spending it on things other than the motorcycles he had 
agreed to buy on Beaudry's behalf. (Tr., p. 94, L. 19 - p. 97, L. 7.) The trial 
court then denied the motion to acquit. (Tr., p. 97, Ls. 8-22.) 
The trial proceeded, and at the end the jury returned a guilty verdict. (Tr., 
p. 256, L. 11 - p. 257, L. 1; R., p. 92.) Johnson filed a motion for judgment of 
acquittal. (R., pp. 94-95.) The district court granted the motion. (R., p. 116; see 
also Tr., p. 265, L. 22 - p. 271, L. 9.) The state filed a timely notice of appeal. 
(R., pp. 118-21.) 
3 
ISSUES 
evidence showed that the victim gave money to buy 
motorcycles from a third party, creating a bailment. Instead Johnson 
appropriated the money to himself. Did the district court err by applying 
an incorrect legal standard to determine that Johnson had a legal right to 
appropriate the money entrusted to him for a different purpose? 
Does this Court have authority to grant the state relief because double 
jeopardy does not bar reinstatement of the jury's guilty verdict? 
4 
principle it was as 
arm's possession 
party and the receiving to ,a case 
stand." (Tr., p 269 Ls. 21 .) The court then reasoned 
Beaudry his 
was therefore 
Although he had a civil 
an interest in the 
in the money" once it to Johnson, 
owner of the money." (Tr., p. 270, 
for breach of contract, "because [Beaudry] did 
there was no theft. , p. 270, Ls. 11-17.) 
a 
1.) 
This analysis is incorrect on both the facts and the law. it is not true that 
in every contract the delivery of physical possession of money or an item 
relinquishes all rights in that money or item. In this case the parties intended that 
Kawasaki, not Johnson, ultimately get the money Beaudry paid. Johnson was a 
mere bailor of the money acting as Beaudry's agent to purchase the motorcycles, 
and was not entitled to use or possession of the money beyond fulfilling his 
bailment or agency. When he misappropriated the money by diverting it to his 
own use he exercised unauthorized control of money that was not his. The 
district court therefore erred and must be reversed. 
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B. 
test district ru on a 
judgment of acquittal is to determine the evidence was to 
sustain a conviction of the crime charged." State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 814, 818, 
186 P.3d 670, 674 (Ct App. 2008). Where the defendant presents evidence, all 
evidence presented at trial is considered. kL If a reasonable juror could have 
found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt the verdict must be sustained, and the 
reviewing court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of 
sustaining the verdict, including cred of witnesses. kL; State v. Doe, 144 
Idaho 796, 798, 172 P 3d 551, 553 (Ct App. 2007). 
C. Johnson Committed Grand Theft By Unauthorized Control When He 
Misappropriated Money Entrusted To Him For A Specific Purpose 
The state charged Johnson with theft by unauthorized control. (R, pp. 30-
31.) "A person commits theft when he knowingly takes or exercises unauthorized 
control over ... the property of another person, with the intent of depriving the 
owner thereof." I.C. § 18-2403(3). There is no dispute that Johnson knowingly 
exercised unauthorized control over about $50,000 with intent of depriving 
Beaudry of that money. The only question is whether the money was Beaudry's 
or Johnson's. The evidence establishes that Beaudry still had legal claim to the 
money greater than Johnson's legal claim because Beaudry gave Johnson that 
money to pay a third party for motorcycles, and thereby created a bailment by 
which Johnson merely held the money in trust 
A bailment is: 
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1 
1,545 12). in this case shows that, 
a to be kept as a money Beaudry delivered to 
Johnson was delivered trust the a special object" 
purchase of motorcycles from Kawasaki. Johnson determined not to 
"d in with purpose of the trust" he exercise 
unauthorized control. Because he held the money only in trust, Johnson did not 
have superior right to the money than Beaud and thus was guilty of theft. 
The district court concluded that where, "in a contractual arm's length 
transaction, a party gives possession of property to the other party and the 
receiving party thereafter fails to perform, a criminal case for theft will not stand." 
(Tr., p. 269, Ls. 18-25.) This is a misstatement of law as applied to theft by 
unauthorized control, where the defendant will often legally acquire possession of 
the property through contract, yet still be guilty of theft by unauthorized control 
once he appropriates that property to his own use instead of the intended use of 
that property. 
Although mere breach of contract should generally not be enforced 
through the criminal law, the "reasons that underlie the rejection of criminal 
sanctions do not apply to the circumstances every case involving a contract." 
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State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 501 P.2d 727, 734 (1972). Thus, where "a 
of .. of another upon any 
express or implied" but then "fraudulently converts [it] to his own use" he "may be 
gu of the crime of embezzlement." lsL 51, 501 P.2d at 735 (internal 
quotations omitted). See also State v. Hamilton, 129 Idaho 938, 941, 935 P .2d 
201: 204 (Ct. App. 1997) (embezzlement includes misappropriating funds after 
defendant lawfully received them). Here Johnson received the money only in 
trust, and therefore committed theft by unauthorized control when he fraudulently 
converted it to his own, rather than its intended, use. 
The cases relied on by the district do not reject the principles 
announced in Jesser, or call them into question. In State v. Bennett, 150 Idaho 
278, 246 P.3d 387 (2010), Bennett purchased a trailer, agreeing to make 
payments on the purchase price. Even though the contract included a term that 
the trailer was not to be moved, and the trailer was chained in its location, 
Bennett moved the trailer and refused to make payments. The state charged 
Bennett with grand theft under I.C. § 18-2403(1). The Court concluded that "a 
seller of goods who has delivered the goods to the buyer, but has not yet been 
paid in full and does not have a security interest, is not an owner of the goods for 
the purposes of I.C. § 18-2403(1 )." lsL at 278, 246 P.3d at 387. Because the 
seller delivered the trailer "without qualification and without retaining a legally 
cognizant security interest" Bennett had a possessory right superior to the 
seller's, and therefore did not steal the trailer from its owner. lsL at 280,246 P.3d 
at 389. 
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In case 
use a 
It =~= had the to 
as it to a party, and 
instead his own a d would have 
been req in that case, 
130 Idaho 945 P,2d 864 (Ct. App, 1997), 
Henninger a pickup upon his promissory note to pay a $5000 down 
" ( had that an 
insurance settlement that amount and the money would wired to him,) 
Henninger did not make the payment, or any other, and was with theft 
by unauthorized control. The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that the contract 
granted Henninger ownership of the pickup and that his control was therefore not 
"unauthorized," 1iL at 641,945 P,2d at 867. 1 
Thus, in both Bennett and Henninger the defendants failed to make 
promised payments under a contract. Failure to make payments did not alone 
deprive them of the already conferred rights to the sold property such that they 
were stealing the property by retaining possession, Unlike Bennett and 
Henninger, however, Johnson was not the intended final recipient of the property 
in question, Rather, Johnson accepted money for a limited purpose of 
1 The Court noted that Henninger likely committed theft by deception by 
misrepresenting that he had $5000 immediately available to him. 1iL at 643, 945 
P.2d at 869. 
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motorcycles from a third party on Beaudry's behalf. What did was 
of a taking money from . although was 
lawful, by appropriating the money instead of delivering it as required by 
contract, he committed theft. 
in State v. Culbreth, 146 Idaho 322,193 P.3d 869 (2008), Culbreth 
broke into the dog pound and took her impounded dog back, and was convicted 
of burglary. The Court of Appeals reversed. Specifically, because Culbreth's 
intent was to recover her dog she did not intend to commit a theft, because the 
pound did not have "a lien upon or other property interest in the dog superior to 
Culbreth's ownership interest." kL. at 324, 193 P.3d at 871. Just as Culbreth did 
not lose her property interest in her dog merely because the pound lawfully took 
custody of it, Beaudry did not lose his right to not have his money 
misappropriated instead of used for its intended purpose merely because he 
provided it to Johnson pursuant to a contract. 
The flaw in the district court's reasoning that all breaches of contract are 
necessarily not thefts is apparent. It can hardly be disputed that a lawyer who 
accepts $55,000 from his client, where $50,000 is meant to pay the settlement 
the lawyer has negotiated and $5,000 is to pay the lawyer's fee, the lawyer would 
commit grand theft by taking the entire sum for himself. Likewise, if Ebenezer 
Scrooge gave a boy outside his window money to buy a Christmas turkey and an 
extra half-crown for his efforts, the boy would commit theft if he kept all the 
money and did not buy the turkey. In both these hypothetical situations the 
10 
a 
h it was for it was 
unauthorized control for the money 
in for purpose Johnson motorcycles 
from a party. district court's conclusion, that "once the 
the money to the defendant, the victim parted with his interest in 
money" and therefore Johnson's ownership interest was superior (Tr., p. 270, Ls. 
8-11), is unsupported by the law is an umeasonable reading of the evidence. 
court erred and reversed. 
II. 
This Court May Reverse The District Court's Judgment Of Acquittal Within The 
Proper Bounds Of Johnson's Protections Against Double Jeopardy 
In this appeal the state challenges the district court's post-verdict 
judgment of acquittal. (R., pp. 92, 116.) Double jeopardy bars post-acquittal 
proceedings on guilt, but does not bar the reinstatement of a previous verdict 
after reversal of a judgment of acquittal. Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 
467 (2005); State v. Carmouche, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d _, 2013 WL 
6153145 (Ct. App. 2013). Because the state seeks reversal of the post-verdict 
judgment of acquittal and reinstatement of the jury verdict, this appeal and the 
state's requested remedy are not barred by double jeopardy. 
11 
reverse 
this 20th 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of December, 2013, I caused 
true and correct copies the foregoing OF RESPON to be 
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
MALCOLM S. DYMKOSKI 
Attorney at Law 
1110 W Park Place, Suite 210 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
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